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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 19, 1999, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled on the
latest in a series of cases stemming from the massive general
adjudication of water rights in central and southern Arizona.' The
t
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areas involved, including the Upper Salt, Verde, Upper Gila, Lower
Gila, Agua Fria, Upper Santa Cruz, and San Pedro watersheds
("watersheds"),' encompass approximately forty-seven percent of the
state's land area and eighty-five percent of its population, including
the cities of Phoenix and Tucson.
The holding of the Arizona Supreme Court, referred to here as
Gila River Ii, addressed several unresolved issues with significant
implications for the affected watersheds, the State of Arizona, and the
arid West. First, the petitioners asked the court to decide whether
federal reserved water rights extend to groundwater.' Second, the
petitioners asked the court to decide whether a federal reserved water
right entitles the right-holder to greater protection from groundwater
pumping than state law provides to state water rights-holders. In an
unanimous decision, the court answered both questions in the
affirmative, taking a strong position on a question left unanswered in
federal water law jurisprudence.6 In addition, the decision may alter
the balance of political and economic power between Indians and
non-Indians in Arizona and the West by recognizing Indian ownership
of a significant portion of the West's most precious commodity-water.
Sections II and III of this note introduce water rights and examine
the development of federal and Indian reserved water rights in the
surface water context and the, so far, limited forays into the
groundwater realm. Section IV reviews the history of the Gila River
general adjudication as it pertains to the recent holding in Gila River
IIZ Section V analyzes the holding in Gila River III and reviews the
legal and policy justifications put forward by the Arizona Supreme
Court. Section VI discusses the arguments of the petitioners who
sought United States Supreme Court review of the Arizona decision
and the implications of the Court's decision to deny their petitions.
Finally, Section VII discusses the future of the Gila River general
adjudication, realistic implications for securing Indian water rights,
and the promise of alternative resolutions, particularly negotiated
settlements.

1. In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. &
Source, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) [hereinafter Gila RiverIII].
2. Id. at 742.
3. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. United States, 989
P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) (No. 99-1388) [hereinafter Phelps Petition].
4. See Gila River II, 989 P.2d at 741.
5. Id.
6. As discussed in Section III below, United States Supreme Court jurisprudence,
beginning with Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), has defined federal
reserved rights to surface water. The Supreme Court has not addressed directly the
extent to which federal water rights extend to groundwater supplies.
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H. STATE-BASED WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINES
A.

SURFACE WATER DOCTRINES

Allocation of surface and groundwater rights is generally the
province of state law. In the surface water context, two main doctrines
prevail: riparian rights and prior appropriation.7 The riparian water
rights doctrine dominates in the eastern half of the country where
water is more readily available. The riparian doctrine relies on a
reasonable use standard, and in times of shortage, calls for all users to
reduce consumption proportionately.8 Application of somewhat
amorphous, reasonableness-based standards has been practical, in
part, because supplies of water in most riparian states are plentiful and
disputes over water supplies have, in general, been few. 9
Prior appropriation for surface water dominates in the arid
western states, and operates on the theory of "first in time, first in
right." Historically, western states have favored prior appropriation
because it is relatively simple to adjudicate and tends to promote
The doctrine prioritizes
development of water resources.
appropriators based on the first date of beneficial use, so the earliest
(most senior) rights-holder is entitled to a greater level of protection
When supplies run short, the doctrine
than those that follow."
protects the rights of the most senior holders and later appropriators
(juniors) may have their supplies restricted or cut off altogether to
ensure flow to senior holders." While historically favored, modern
prioritization of water rights using this approach raises concern as
water law doctrine pits agricultural and tribal appropriators with
century-old priority dates against relative newcomers-burgeoning
urban populations in Arizona and other western states.
B.

GROUNDWATER DOCTRINES

In the groundwater context, five water rights doctrines have
developed and their application varies by state."

7.

For a more extensive discussion of the riparian and prior appropriation water

rights doctrines, seeJOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURcES: CASES
& MATERIALS (3d ed. 2000). While most states have adopted the riparian or prior

appropriation doctrine to govern surface water allocation, some jurisdictions, like
California, recognize elements of both the riparian and prior appropriation systems.
See id. at 295-309.
8. Id. at 9.
9. For a brief overview of water resources across the United States, see id. at 2-9.
10. For examples of statutory appropriation and beneficial use provisions, see ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-141 (B), 45-151 (West 2000).
11. See SAX ET AL., supra note 7, at 98-99.
12. For a more detailed review of the development and application of groundwater
law doctrines, see id., at 359-85. For a state-by-state review of groundwater law, see
Kevin L. Patrick & Kelly E. Archer, A Comparison of State Groundwater Laws, 30 TULSA
L.J. 123 (1994).
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1. Absolute Ownership
The absolute ownership groundwater doctrine (also known as the
capture rule) maintains that a landowner holds an absolute right to
pump groundwater under his or her property, regardless of the effects
on water levels. In reality, modern applications of the absolute
ownership doctrine exist within the context of state or local permitting
structures, thus the doctrine regulates pumping practices to some
extent. 3
2.

Prior Appropriation

The prior appropriation groundwater doctrine mirrors the surface
water system, granting pumping rights to the most senior user and
protecting those rights against encroachment by later users.
3.

Correlative Rights

The correlative rights groundwater doctrine most closely mirrors
the surface water riparian doctrine, allowing reasonable use in "fair
and just proportion" by overlying landowners on their land. This
doctrine allows for the exporting of water to other tracts if surplus
supply is available. 4
4.

Reasonable Use

The reasonable use groundwater doctrine similarly restricts
landowners to reasonable usage, but more rigidly restricts application
to the overlying tract (exports are generally prohibited).
5.

Restatement Approach

The liability-based doctrine defined in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts holds parties that unreasonably harm other groundwater users
liable in tort. 5
Ill. THE SUPREME COURT AND FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS
State water rights systems, which consist of various combinations of
the water doctrines described above, are generally applicable to
anyone seeking a water right including individuals, corporations, and
government entities. However, when a federal entity seeks to establish
a water right on federally reserved property, such as tribal reservations
or national parks, a distinct water right outside of the relevant state
system may apply. Federal reserved water rights, as the name implies,
are water rights reserved for federal uses outside of a state water rights

13. In Texas, for example, the courts have upheld the application of the capture
rule subject to local regulatory controls. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of
America, 1 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Tex. 1999).
14. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903).
15. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979).
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system. 6 Congress's power to "reserve" water rights stems primarily
from the Interstate Commerce Clause in Article I, section 8 of the
United States Constitution. 7 While the logical connection between
surface water and commerce is more direct, the United States
Supreme Court has ruled that Congress's power to regulate commerce
extends to groundwater supplies as well." Particularly in the arid West,
the specter of previously unexercised water rights outside of the
prevailing state system is serious, with far-reaching implications for
existing and future users.
A.

THE WNTERSDOCTRINE

Until recent decades, it was rare for Congress, or the President
exercising delegated congressional power, to address the question of
water rights when reserving lands for federal purposes such as parks,

9
In the absence of express
military reservations, or Indian lands.'
legislative reservations of water rights, the Supreme Court recognized
"implied" reservations of water rights carrying the force of federal law.
In the landmark case of Winters v. United States, the Court first
established that the federal government impliedly reserved sufficient
waters to "supp ort the purpose" of the reservation when setting aside
In Winters, the reservation in question was the 1888
federal lands.
Fort Belknap Indian reservation in Montana as set aside by treaty."
Noting that "[t]he lands were arid and, without irrigation, were
practically valueless," the Court in Winters established that the federal
government had the power to "reserve the waters and exempt them
from appropriation under the state laws" and that the priority date for
the rights should be traced to the May 1888 treaty.2 To that end, the
federal government could enjoin non-Indian diversions of water
upstream of the reservation to secure sufficient water resources to
make the downstream tribal lands viable.
While Winters was a revolutionary holding with significant potential
impacts on states containing Indian lands, more than fifty years passed
before the Supreme Court addressed critical questions regarding the

16. Federal uses include those water uses on withdrawn federal lands such as
national parks, forests, and wildlife refuges. See generally SAX ET AL., supra note 7, at
782-815. Federal uses also include waters used on Indian lands for which the federal
government acts as a trustee. Id. at 848.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
18. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941,953-54 (1982).
19. The Federal Wild and Scenic Rivers Act was one of the first pieces of federal
legislation to reserve waters specifically to fulfill the purposes of the Act. 16 U.S.C. §§
1271-1287 (1994). Executive Orders that withdraw federal lands under Federal
Antiquities Act authority, including the 1996 order creating the Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument, also have addressed the issues of water needs.
Proclamation No. 6920, 3 C.F.R. 64 (1996). See SAX ETAL., supra note 7, at 812-14 for
additional examples of federal legislation addressing water rights and a discussion of
the uncertain scope of these express reservations.
20. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
21. Id. at 567-68.
22. Id. at 576-77.
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potential extension of implied rights to non-Indian federal
reservations and methods for quantifying reserved federal rights. In
1963, the Court ruled unequivocally in Arizona v. California that
implied water rights extend to all federal land reservations, not just
Indian lands.2 In addition, the Court in Arizona v. Caliorniaupheld a
method for quantifying Indian water rights based on "practicably
irrigable acreage" ("PIA"), operating under the assumption that the
primary purpose of most reservations was to support an agricultural
Indian community."
In light of the size of tribal land holdings in
many states, the PIA standard acknowledged significant Indian water
rights. For example, in the Gila River adjudication, tribal interests
claim 2.8 million acre-feet of water per year (surface and
groundwater)." By way of comparison, the typical annual surface
water supply in the entire Gila River Basin is approximately 1.3 million
acre-feet per year. 6 The approximately 1.5 million acre-feet difference
would come, in theory, from groundwater supplies.
As in Winters, the Arizona v. Calfornia dispute concerned surface
water allocations, making no mention of groundwater. Even today,
ninety-two years after the Supreme Court decided Winters, the Court
has yet to address squarely the issue of implied rights to groundwater.
The closest the Court has come to addressing the groundwater
question is its holding in Cappaert v. United States.2 In that dispute,
regarding the Devil's Hole underground pools at Death Valley
National Monument, the Court avoided the question of implied
groundwater rights by declaring that the pool in question was surface
water governed by the Winters doctrine. 8However,
the Court in
Cappaert did address the fact that the diversion of groundwater
through pumping of wells adjacent to the National Monument
threatened the Devil's Hole pools. The Court held "the United States
can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion
is of surface or ground water."" While the Court did not recognize an
implied federal right to groundwater, it did recognize federal authority
to regulate pumping of groundwater that interfered with surface
waters under federal control. Significantly, the Court also recognized
federal authority to reach beyond the borders of the federal reservation
to limit withdrawal of groundwater by other parties acting under state
law. Commentator Charles Meyers noted Cappaertlaid a "foundation
for extensive and disruptive federal claims to groundwater. " 'o
23. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963). United States v. Dist. Ct., 401

U.S. 520, 523 (1971) extended this holding further to encompass "any federal
enclave."
24. Arizona v. California,373 U.S. at 600-01.
25. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7 n.5, Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v.
United States, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) (No. 99-1389) [hereinafter SRVWUA Petition].

26. Id.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143.
Charles J. Meyers, FederalGroundwaterRights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States,
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APPLICATION OF THE WNTERs DOCTRINE IN OTHER FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS

Other federal and state courts have shown greater willingness than
the United States Supreme Court to expressly address the issue of
implied federal rights to groundwater. The Ninth Circuit holding in
the Cappaert case, later vacated by the Supreme Court, reasoned that
the implied rights doctrine should extend to groundwater."1 The court
noted that, while the Winters and Arizona v. Californiacases dealt only
with surface water, the "reservation of water doctrine is not so
limited."32 Other courts in the Ninth Circuit have reached similar
findings as to groundwater. The United States District Court for the
District of Montana, in Tweedy v. Texas Co., ruled that, even though
Winters addressed surface water,
the same implications which led the Supreme Court to hold that
surface waters had been reserved would apply to underground waters
as well. The land was arid-water would make it more useful, and
on the surface of the land or under it
whether the waters were found
3
should make no difference.
Furthermore, in Shamberger v. United States, the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada held that state water regulations could
not encumber federal rights to pump groundwater on a naval
ammunition depot.34 When use of groundwater was necessary to
achieve the purpose of the naval reservation, the federal government
clearly had an implied right to groundwater despite the fact the
legislation reserving the land made no mention of water rights.
This willingness to extend Winters to groundwater is by no means
unanimous. In 1988, the Wyoming Supreme Court faced the issue in
its consideration of the Big Horn River system general adjudication
and refused to extend the Winters doctrine to groundwater rights."
While the court acknowledged groundwater and surface water are
often interconnected and "[t]he logic which supports a reservation of
surface water to fulfill the purpose of the reservation also supports
reservation of groundwater," it noted, "nonetheless, not a single case
applying the reserved water doctrine to groundwater is cited to us." 36
The court found the Tweedy holding unpersuasive and concluded that
Tweedy "did not recognize a reserved groundwater right."" Finding no
strong precedent to extend federal implied rights to groundwater, and
in light of the significant implications such a holding would have on
13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 377 (1978).
31. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974).
32. Id.
33. Tweedy v. Tex. Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968).
34. Shamberger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600, 610-11 (D. Nev. 1958).
35. In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 100 (Wyo. 1988).
36. Id. at 99.
37. Id. at 100.
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water rights under state law, the Big Horn court was unwilling to make
new law.
IV. ARIZONA WATER LAW
Under Arizona's general adjudication statute, adjudications are
intended to determine the "extent and relative priority of the water
rights of all persons in the river system and source."38 While highly
complex, formal adjudication of rights provides certainty and security
for rights holders and resolution for long-standing disputes among
parties with competing claims to water. As the plain language of the
statute indicates, the Arizona legislature intended that adjudications
include all parties with claims to water rights, including individuals,
corporations, government entities (local, state, or federal), Indian
tribes, and any other entities. 9 Likewise, the general terms "river
system and source" encompass all appropriable waters (i.e., those
surface waters in the state subject to the prior appropriation doctrine)
and "all water subject to claims based upon federal law."40
A. HISTORYOF THE GILA PRRADJUDICATION

The Salt River Valley Water Users Association ("SRVWUA") filed
the original petition for the Gila River adjudication pursuant to state
law in 1974 . The issue for SRVWUA and the thousands of other
water users in the affected watersheds was simple: there was not
enough water to go around. Determining how to divide the available
water was, and continues to be, an exceedingly complicated task. In
the twenty-six years since the adjudication began, the geographic scope
of the adjudication has expanded to include seven watersheds.
Approximately 849,000 summonses were sent to potential claimants
and, as a result, more than 24,000 claimants have filed over 66,000
claims to water rights.4 2 Over the same period, judicial proceedings
begun in state court were transferred to federal court and then back to
state court.43 Much of the early judicial wrangling focused on two
issues: inclusion of tribal interests and procedural management of the
case.
As the parties were still defining the scope of the adjudication in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the question whether the state courts

38. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-252 (A) (West 2000).

39. Id. § 45-251.
40. Id. § 45-251(7).
41. For a review of the procedural history of the original case, see In re Rights to the

Use of the Gila River, 830 P.2d 442, 444-45 (Ariz. 1992) [hereinafter Gila River].
42. The case is seemingly so complex that even the two parties filing writs of
certiorari to the Supreme Court do not cite the same number of claims and claimants
filed in the case. Phelps Petition, supra note 3, at 5, notes that 24,000 claimants have
filed more than 66,000 claims. SRVWUA Petition, supra note 25, at ii, suggests that

more than 27,000 parties have filed over 77,000 claims.
43. For a review of the complicated proceedings leading up to the current phase of
the adjudication, see United States v. Super. Ct., 697 P.2d 658, 664 (Ariz. 1985).
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had valid jurisdiction over tribal interests in the watersheds was still
unclear. In response to the summonses, several tribes exerted claims
to water rights and, subsequently, Arizona required the tribes to file
claims to join the state proceedings. Not wishing to become part of
the general adjudication, the tribes petitioned the federal courts,
arguing the Arizona courts lacked jurisdiction due to the tribes'
sovereign immunity. 44 Resolution of the sovereign immunity questions
hinged on the interpretation of the McCarran Amendment, which
provides a limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity in suits
involving the adjudication of water rights.45 A series of cases tried this
question, culminating in the United States Supreme Court decision in
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, which expressly extended McCarran
Amendment authority to Indian water rights held in trust by the
United States.46 To that end, the Gila River general adjudication joined
the tribal claims to water rights and extended the Arizona courts'
authority to all claims held by private parties, state and local
governments, and federal interests (both Indian and non-Indian).
The current phase of the Gila River adjudication focuses on six
issues identified by the Superior Court in pretrial orders. 47 The
Arizona Supreme Court granted a request for interlocutory review of
these issues in December 1990 and, the holdings in its three Gila River
opinions have addressed four of the six issues.4 ' The holding in the
second Gila River adjudication,4 9 which addressed Issue Two, is
particularly relevant to the deliberations in Gila River III.
Unlike most western states that apply the doctrine of prior
appropriation to both surface water and interconnected groundwater

44. Id.
45. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994). Also known as the "McCarran Amendment," section
666 waives sovereign immunity when the United States is the defendant in a state or
federal water rights action. In Dugan v. Rank, the Supreme Court limited the
McCarran Amendment's application to general adjudications. See 372 U.S. 609, 618
(1963).
46. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 566 (1983).
47. The Arizona Supreme Court accepted the following six questions for review:
1. Do the procedures for filing and service of pleadings adopted by the trial
court in its Pre-trial Order Number 1 comport with due process under the
United States and Arizona Constitutions?
2. Did the trial court err in adopting its 50%/90 day test for determining
whether underground water is 'appropriable' under A.RS. § 45-141?
3. What is the appropriate standard to be applied in determining the
amount of water reserved for federal lands?
4. Is non-appropriable groundwater subject to federal reserved rights?
5. Do federal reserved rights holders enjoy greater protection from
groundwater pumping than holders of state law rights?
6. Must claims of conflicting water use or interference with water rights be
resolved as part of the general adjudication?
Gila RiverIII, 989 P.2d 739, 742 n.2 (Ariz. 1999).
48. In Gila River I, 830 P.2d 442, 455-56 (Ariz. 1992), the Arizona Supreme Court
addressed Issue One and upheld, against a due process challenge, the Superior
Court's methods of notifying the vast number of parties in the case.
49. See generally In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila
River Sys. & Source, 857 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. 1993) [hereinafter Gila RiverI1].
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sources, Arizona maintains a bifurcated system that applies the prior
appropriation doctrine to surface water and the reasonable use
doctrine to groundwater. A common law distinction exists between
"percolating" groundwater (i.e., deeper groundwater supplies)
and
near-surface groundwater or "subflow." 0 Historically, Arizona courts
have defined subflow as "those waters which slowly find their way
through the sand and gravel constituting the bed of the stream, or the
lands under or immediately adjacent to the stream, and are themselves
a part of the surface stream.
This common law distinction between
subflow and other forms of groundwater greatly complicates allocation
of water rights because, in reality, there are no easily discernible
methods for differentiating between subflow and percolating
groundwater. As the Gila River III court noted, this fact has not
escaped most other jurisdictions in the West. The Gila River III court
made clear that most other states applying prior appropriation to
surface water have "[c]onform[ed] their law to hydrological reality"
and apply a unitary management system of prior appropriation for
surface water and groundwater.52
Hydrologic reality notwithstanding, the Arizona Supreme Court
reviewed the efficacy of the bifurcated water rights system in the 1993
Gila River II case and upheld the admittedly "narrow concept of
subflow." 3 The court noted that "[t] he Arizona legislature has erected
statutory frameworks for regulating surface water and groundwater
based on Southwest Cotton," and held it was essentially too late to
overrule the established practice.54 Therefore, while Arizona's prior
appropriation system continues to allocate surface and subflow waters,
reasonable use governs the allocation of percolating groundwater. As
a result, parties with appropriated rights to surface water or subflow
are unable to protect their water rights against parties whose pumping
of percolating groundwater depletes their appropriable surface water
supply. As long as the party pumping groundwater conforms to the
relatively loose confines of the reasonable use doctrine, appropriated
rights-holders have little protection under state law. 5
Considering the Arizona general adjudication of water rights
statute defines "river system and source" to include all water subject to
prior appropriation," the Gila River II decision further complicates
matters. By limiting application of the general adjudications to waters
subject to prior appropriation, the state statute effectively exempts
percolating waters from inclusion in the general adjudications. The
50. Id
51. Gila River III, 989 P.2d at 743 (quoting Maricopa County Mun. Water
Conservation Dist. No. 1 v. S.W. Cotton Co., 4 P.2d 369, 380 (Ariz. 1931)).
52. Id. at 744.
53. Gila River II, 857 P.2d at 1247.
54. Id. at 1243. For further discussion of Arizona's bifurcated water rights system,
seeJohn D. Leshy &James Belanger, Arizona Law Where Ground and Surface Water Meet,
20 ARIz. ST. LJ. 657 (1988).
55. Gila River II, 989 P.2d at 749.
56. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-251(7) (West 2000).
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involvement of federal interests complicates the issue still further. As
the Gila River III court observed, "[t]he rub is that, in order to
adjudicate and quantify water rights based upon federal law, the
Arizona courts must afford federal claimants the benefit, when state
and federal law conflict, of federal substantive law."57 With respect to
the surface waters in the watersheds, federal law is clear-the Winters
doctrine impliedly reserved water rights for Indian and non-Indian
federal reservations. With respect to percolating groundwater in the
watersheds, however, federal law is uncertain.
V. THE G/LA RIVER MILITIGATION
The Gila River III litigation addressed two of the six questions set
for interlocutory review by the Arizona Supreme Court.5 1 Issue Four
asked if federal reserved water rights extend to groundwater not
subject to prior appropriation under Arizona law.59 Issue Five asked if
federal reserved water rights holders enjoy greater protection from
groundwater pumping than holders of state-based water rights. 60 The
Arizona Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative.
A. ISSUE FOUR
In Gila River III, the Arizona Supreme Court began by considering
the lower court's finding that federal reserved water rights apply to
non-appropriable
percolating
groundwater
in
addition
to
appropriable surface water and subflow.6
"According to the trial
court, federal law establishes a reserved right to groundwater, if and to
the extent that groundwater ma be necessary to accomplish the
purpose of a federal reservation."6 Acknowledging that other federal
and state courts have split opinions and that no previous court has
squarely settled the issue, the Gila River III court first reviewed the
development of the federal reserved rights doctrine to assess the
efficacy of applying federal rights to groundwater.
Drawing from the United States Supreme Court cases on federal
reserved water rights noted in Section III, the court identified a series
of doctrinal "guideposts" to support its holding. From Winters, the
court drew the fact that one could not make arid Indian lands
habitable without an accompanying reservation of water.6 ' From
Arizona v. California, it drew the notion that one could not possibly
believe that the parties who created the Indian reservations, Congress
and Indian leaders, did not intend to provide water-especially in

57. Gila River III, 989 P.2d at 744-45 (citing Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,
463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983)).
58. Id. at 742.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 742-43.
62. Id. at 745.
63. Gila River II, 989 P.2d 739, 746 (Ariz. 1999).
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regions with no flowing surface streams." From Cappaert, the court
drew the recognition that surface water and groundwater are integrally
linked, suggesting that federal reserved rights law would "decline to
differentiate" between the two sources of water."
The Gila River M court went on to say:
[T] he cases we have cited lead us to conclude that if the United
States implicitly intended, when it established reservations, to reserve
sufficient unappropriated water to meet the reservations' needs, it
must have intended that reservation of water to come from whatever

particular sources each reservation had at hand. The significant
question for the purpose of the reserved rights doctrine is not
whether the water runs above or below the ground but whether it is
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.

In its holding, the court rejected petitioners' two main arguments
in support of state water law. First, the court rejected a claim, based
on United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., that it "should decline to extend68
the doctrine to groundwater out of deference to state water law."
Kimbell Foods found that a state court could legally apply state law as a
rule of decision in an analysis of federal rights as long as such an
application would not "frustrate specific objectives of the federal
programs."" While the Gila River III court acknowledged a tradition of
congressional deference to state water law, it distinguished federal
reserved water rights from the federal loan programs at issue in Kimbell
Foods. Noting that federal reserved water rights were clearly an
exception to congressional deference and that federal rights to water
were supreme, the court rejected the notion that it could "withhold
application of the reserved rights doctrine purely out of deference to
state law."70 The court stated, "[r]ather, we may not defer to state law
where to do so would defeat federal water rights.01
Petitioners argued as well that deference to state law would not
defeat federal water rights. To the contrary, they argued that
Arizona's reasonable use standard for groundwater allocation would
provide all parties with an equal right to pump "as much groundwater
as they can put to reasonable use upon their land."7 For support,
petitioners cited Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, which held that state
and federal courts may adopt state law where "[t]here was no
reason.., for the beneficiaries of federal rights to have a privileged
position over other[s]."" In the instant case, however, the court
64. Id. (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963)).
65. Id.at 747.
66. Id.

67. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
68.
69.

Gila River II, 989 P.2d at 747.
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728.

70. Gila River II, 989 P.2d 739, 747 (Ariz. 1999).
71.

Id.

72. Id. at 747-48
73. Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 674 (1979); Gila RiverII, 989 P.2d
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rejected both the suggestion that the reasonable use system protected
federal groundwater rights and the proposition that federal rights are
not privileged. The court cited evidence that, under Arizona's
reasonable use system, groundwater consumption rates had far
surpassed recovery rates and depleted the groundwater resource.'4
Further, the court noted that some Indian reservations "have been
entirely 'dewatered' by off-reservation pumping." 7 In sum, the court
refused to accept the notion that deference to Arizona's
groundwater
76
allocation system would protect federal water rights.
While the court debunked petitioners' main arguments, it also
limited the scope of its finding in favor of federal and Indian
interests. 7 First, it made clear that individual tribes do not have an
automatic reserved right to groundwater. The court noted a federal
reserved groundwater right could only be found where other waters
are insufficient to accomplish the purposes of the reservation.
Determining the purpose of the reservation and assessing the
sufficiency of available sources of water are fact-specific inquiries
courts must make on a reservation-by-reservation basis.78 Second, the
court refused to impose a generalized standard that future courts
could use to determine the purpose(s) of a reservation and, in turn,
the extent of the federal groundwater right. The court opted again to
rely on a case-by-case review of the pertinent treaties, legislation, or
Executive Orders that formed the reservation. 9 Based on this
reasoning, the court rejected an Indian claim that tribal groundwater
rights should extend to all groundwater under the reservation. The
court noted that the Supreme Court "has rejected tribal claims to an
'untrammeled right' to exploit scarce natural resources.""0
B.

ISSUE FIVE

With regard to Issue Five, the trial court in Gila River III held
"federal reserved rights holders are entitled to protection from any offreservation groundwater pumping that 'significantly diminishes' the
amount of water available to satisfy the purpose of the reservation. " 8
The Arizona Supreme Court upheld this finding, drawing on two
elements from the United States Supreme Court holding in Cappaert.
(1) "determination of reserved water rights is not governed by state law
but derives from the federal purpose of the reservation;" and (2) "the
United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether
at 747-48.
74. Gila River II, 989 P.2d at 748.
75. Id. (citing Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct.

660, 665-66 (1986)).
76. Id. at 748.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978)).
79. Id. at 748-49.
80. Gila RiverIII, 989 P.2d 739, 749 n.10 (Ariz. 1999) (quoting Washington v. Wash.
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 684 (1979)).
81. Id. at 743.

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 4

the diversion is of surface or groundwater."82 The Gila River III court
held federal right holders do enjoy greater protections from
groundwater pumping than holders of state-based rights.83 The federal
government may invoke federal substantive law to protect its
groundwater from subsequent diversion, at least to the extent
necessary to accomplish the purposes of the reservation.
The court rejected an argument by proponents of state water law
that Arizona's 1980 Groundwater Management Code ("Code")
provides adequate protection for federal water rights interests within
the state." The Code, honored by the Ford Foundation and Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government as one of the nation's ten
most innovative programs in state and local government, established a
series of controls to stabilize and more efficiently allocate the state's
groundwater resources. 8 The Code's provisions include the creation
of four (later increased to five) Active Management Areas ("AMAs")
that focus on the areas of the state with the most severe groundwater
overdraft problems.
Controls within AMAs include permits for
groundwater withdrawals, limitations on new irrigation, requirements
to meter and report pumping levels, and fees on groundwater
pumpers-all intended to help the state achieve a renewable "safe
yield" groundwater supply by the year 2025. The Gila River III court
noted that, while the Code provides increased protection for
groundwater supplies within AMAs, there are no protections for
federal reservations located outside the AMAs." As a rule, it would be
impossible for anyone to guarantee an appropriate level of protection
for a specific reservation without a case-by-case review of how state
management programs would protect water rights on that federal
reservation."
Just as the Gila River III court limited its holding on Issue Four, it
also limited its Issue Five holding. Specifically, the court rejected the
suggestion that the case law requires a "zero-impact standard of
protection for federal reserved rights."0 Under such a standard,
federal rights holders could theoretically enjoin any groundwater or
surface water withdrawals that could have a negative impact on their
water rights. Relying on Cappaert and United States v. New Mexico, the
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 749 (quoting Cappaertv. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143, 145 (1976)).
Id. at 750.
Id.

85. Id. at 749 n.13.
86. For a discussion of the development and scope of the Arizona Groundwater
Management Code, see Philip R Higdon & Terence W. Thompson, The 1980 Arizona
Groundwater Management Code, 1980 ARIz. ST. L.J 621 (1980) or visit ARIz. DEP'T OF
WATER RESOURCES, OVERVIEW OF ARIZONA'S GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT CODE, available
at http://www.adwr.state.az.us/AZWaterInfo/groundwater/code.html.
The Ford
Foundation/Harvard
Innovation
Award
is
available
at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/innovations/winners/gmcaz86.htm.
87. SeeARiz. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, supranote 79.
88. Gila River II, 989 P.2d 739, 749 n.13 (Ariz. 1999).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 750.
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court noted that federal reserved water rights are limited to amounts
necessary to achieve the primary purposes of the reservation. Any
injunctions to curtail actions by outside parties must be "appropriately
tailored to minimal need."9 To that end, the court rejected a tribal
petition to enjoin immediately all pumping that would affect the
groundwater supplies beneath reservation land. The court responded
that, until federal reserved rights for individual reservations are
it is unclear "which if any of the tribes are entitled to such
quantified,
92
relief."
C.

CONCLUSIONS IN GILA RIVER III

The Arizona Supreme Court's conclusions in Gila River III
acknowledged the complexity of adjudicating water rights on such a
massive scale and, in particular, while operating under Arizona's
bifurcated water rights system. 9' The court acknowledged that, while a
bifurcated water rights system may make sense within the context of
state law, federal law does not allow the state to limit the extent of
federal rights. The court proposed that, in order "[t]o solve the
conflict and uncertainty that reserved rights engender, we must
quantify them, for we may not ignore them." 94 The court reflected
further:
In the scheme of priorities, the claims of the federal government...
and of the Indians rank high. While the amount of water actually

used by these entities may have been negligible until recent times, the
magnitude95of the right to use water on these lands has been far from
negligible.
VI. PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Salt River Valley Water Users Association and the Phelps
Dodge Corporation each filed petitions for writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court in February 2000 requesting review of
the Arizona Supreme Court decision in Gila River III. Both the Salt
River Valley Water Users Association petition ("SRVWUA petition")
and the Phelps Dodge Corporation petition ("Phelps petition") argued
that the Gila River III holding was misguided, with serious and
immediate implications for the on-going Gila River adjudication
9 6 and
for all efforts to adjudicate or negotiate water rights in the West.
The petitioners' main legal arguments challenged the Arizona
Supreme Court's refusal to apply state groundwater law to the
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. at 749 n.12.
Id. at 750.
Gila River III, 989 P.2d 739, 750 (Ariz. 1999).
Id. (quoting United States v. Super. Ct., 697 P.2d 658, 663 (Ariz. 1985)).
See SRVWUA Petition, supra note 25, at 10, 14-15; Phelps Petition, supranote 3, at
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determination of federal water rights. On a procedural level, they
argued that the Gila River III court violated Winters and New Mexico by
establishing the existence of federal groundwater rights prior to an
individual determination of the purpose of each reservation. "
Further, they proposed the holding creates a previously unrecognized
principle of federal common law-that Winters guarantees federal
interests a supply of water rather than giving them a
"nondiscriminatory right of access to a shared resource." 9" Petitioners
also contested the Arizona court's reading of Kimbell Foods, arguing
that no sufficient conflict exists between federal policy and state law in
this instance to preclude application of state law to determine the
extent of federal water rights." Finally, petitioners attacked the
Arizona court's treatment of Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe and argued
(1) no need exists for a nationally uniform standard on federal
groundwater rights; (2) application of state law would not frustrate
federal objectives as feared; and (3) creation of federal law would
significantly disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law
in Arizona and other states.'00
Both petitioners reinforced their case-based arguments with a
number of other claims intended to garner the attention of the high
court. From a policy perspective, they argued the Gila RiverIIIholding
frustrated a long-standing federal preference, both legislative and
judicial, for deference to state water rights law."'
Drawing on
preferences for intentionalist theory of judicial interpretation, they
argued the nineteenth century Congress that created many
reservations could not have intended to reserve groundwater
supplies-a largely unknown and unrecoverable resource at that
time.'02 Further, they maintained the establishment of guaranteed
federal rights would produce absurd and unintended results by
creating new conflicts among federal water rights holders, and pitting
Indian and other federal interests against one another in competition
for a limited water supply.' 3 Petitioners also focused on the extended
scope of the potential federal reserved water rights, noting the
97. Phelps Petition, supra note 3, at 14-15.
98. Id. at 17. Arguably, however, there is a clearly recognized principle from
Winters that federal reserved water rights are superior to state rights and exempt from
state appropriation systems. See discussion, supra Section III; see also supra text
accompanying notes 16-18.
99. Phelps Petition, supra note 3, at 17-22. Arguably, however, the nature of the
conflict in Gila River III is similar to Winters-a dispute between state and federal
parties each claiming rights to a limited supply of water. If so, then the Gila River III
conflict, like Winters before it, would appear sufficient to warrant preclusion of state
law and invocation of implied federal reserved water rights.
100. See id. at 18-23, for a review of the Wilson arguments and a discussion of the
potential economic disruption in Arizona.
101. Id. at 26. The Amid Curiae brief, submitted by the Mountain States Legal
Foundation, Montana Farm Bureau Federation, Idaho Farm Bureau Federation, and
Northwest Mining Association in support of the petitioners in the Phelps and SRVWUA
Petitionsfor writs of certiorari, reinforced these arguments.
102. SRVWUA Petition, supra note 25, at 27.
103. Id. at 20-23.
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establishment of federal rights that could grant Indian tribes control
of most of the groundwater in the state of Arizona, would simply be
unreasonable."" Finally, they argued the United States Supreme Court
should eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the scope of federal
rights and resolve the direct conflict between the Gila River III and the
Wyoming Supreme Court's Big Horn decision.105
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE GILA RIVER IIIDECISIONS IN ARIZONA

On June 19, 2000, the United States Supreme Court denied both
the Phelps and SRVWUA petitions for writ of certiorari. In doing so,
the Court let stand the Arizona Supreme Court's interpretation of the
nature and extent of federal reserved rights to groundwater and
ensured that, unless and until the Court sees fit to address the issue in
a later case, questions of federal reserved rights to groundwater will be
played out on a state-by-state basis. Certainly, the decision not to hear
the Gila River III case will have repercussions in Arizona, with the
potential to dramatically shift the balance of power and equity in water
rights.0 6 The Supreme Court's decision not to rehear the case hands
in Arizona, and potentially other states, a major
tribal interests
17
victory.

Under the Gila River III holding, Arizona recognizes a superior
federal interest in groundwater supplies based on an individualized
review of a reservation's purpose and subject to certain use limitations.
This superior federal interest in groundwater, when quantified using
the PIA standard set out in Arizona v. Calf[ornia, may result in
significant allocations of water to tribal interests in the state. Unlike
the surface water context, where "paper rights" to surface water are
often of little or no use due to the lack of infrastructure to transport
water and put water rights to practical use, groundwater is usually
more accessible, requiring little more than a well and pump to
In the
distribute water for agricultural or domestic uses.10 8
104. Id. at 15.
105. Id. at 12; Phelps Petition,supra note 3, at 28.
106. See Paul Davenport, Supreme Court Rules Tribes Have Extra Water Protection,ARIZ.
REPUBLiC, Nov. 21, 1999, at B6; Howard Fischer & Maureen O'Connell, Court Rules for
Indians in Suit Over Ground Water Rights of Arizona Cities, Mines Deemed Secondary, ARIZ.
DAILYSTAR, Nov. 20, 1999, at IA.
107. In light of the arguments of the petitioners and amici curiae in favor of state's
rights and federal deference, the Supreme Court's response is somewhat ironic. By
denying certiorari, the Supreme Court deferred to the state interpretation of water
rights. Interestingly, the state interpretation subjugates state-based water rights to
those of the federal government.
108. One has yet to see how federal water rights would translate to usable water
allocations or money. Despite tacit approval from the Supreme Court, lower court
challenges to efforts to transfer water rights from state-rights holders to federal-rights
holders could considerably delay final resolution. Challenges against critical decision
points to determine the purposes of the reservation and assign detailed groundwater
allocations to specific reservations will likely arise in situations where any new federal
water allocations come directly out of the hands of former state-rights holders.
Negotiated settlements, see discussion infra Section VII, may present the most realistic
option for resolving water rights disputes. For a discussion of efforts to negotiate a

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 4

groundwater context, therefore, increased water rights are more likely
to lead to increased water supply. Along with potentially increased
rights to water, Gila River III provides added security for federal and
Indian water rights holders. In light of the Supreme Court holding in
Cappaert, the combined effect of the Gila River III and Cappaert
holdings will grant federal groundwater rights holders in Arizona the
ability to curtail public or private off-reservation uses that have a
negative impact on their groundwater supplies. While courts in
Arizona are likely to carefully scrutinize both the purposes of the
reservation and the level of outside groundwater interference, the
specter of federal rights looms large over groundwater-dependent
parties adjoining or in the vicinity of federal reservations.
B.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE GILA RIvER IDECISIONS OUTSIDE OF
ARIZONA

One must note the fact that Arizona's bifurcated system of
groundwater rights is the exception and not the rule among western
states.'" Most western states apply the prior appropriation doctrine to
groundwater and recognize federal rights based on seniority of use.
While many federal and Indian groundwater reservations date back to
the early 19th century, most western state law systems determine the
relative seniority of the water right based on the right-holder's date of
first use of the water supply." ° In light of the fact that many federal
and Indian water rights claims are based on relatively modern first
uses, the Arizona Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of federal
reserved water rights and the superposition of federal rights over
seniority-based state rights takes on even greater significance.
Recent evidence from Montana, a prior appropriation state,
indicates that its courts are also willing to extend federal reservations
to groundwater. In Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, the
Montana Supreme Court denied the requests of state and private
parties for permits to withdraw groundwater from tribal lands."'
Noting that the Montana Constitution protects existing water rights
"whether adjudicated or unadjudicated," the court, holding that
the
Montana Constitution protects tribal rights to groundwater against
subsequent appropriators, reinforced the distinction2 between stateappropriated rights and federal reserved water rights."
While age-old tribal rights to groundwater may fare well in some
prior appropriation states, tribal rights may not fare well in others. If
water rights settlement in the Gila River Basin, see discussion infraSection VII.A.
109. See SRVWUA Petition,supra note 25, at 26 n.19.
110. See generally SAX ET AL., supra note 7, at 382; see also Elizabeth Checchio &
Bonnie G. Colby, The Contextl for Indian Water Settlements, in WATER LAW: TRENDS,
PoucIEs, AND PRAcncE 179, 182-83 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D. Crammond
eds., 1995).
111. See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 992 P.2d 244, 250 (Mont.
1999).
112. Id.
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the Wyoming court continues to follow the Big Horn holding discussed
in Section III.B, the court will limit the scope of federal reserved rights
to include surface waters alone. The Big Horn decision relied heavily
on the fact that no court had established a federal reserved right to
groundwater. The Arizona and Montana Supreme Courts have now
clearly acknowledged federal rights to groundwater, and further
evidence exists that the Supreme Court finds such an interpretation
acceptable. One still does not know, however, how the Arizona,
Montana, and United States Supreme Court actions will influence
Wyoming and other prior appropriation states.
VII. THE FUTURE OF THE GILA RIVER ADJUDICATION
Regardless of the recent developments in the Gila River III
litigation, one thing is clear-the tedious general adjudication process
has failed to provide a timely resolution to water rights disputes in the
watersheds, whether they involve surface water or groundwater. Even
after the resolution of the remaining questions before the Arizona
Supreme Court in the Gila River general adjudication, decades will
likely pass before the adjudication process produces final water
allocations among private, state, and federal interest-holders. When
and if the court completes a final quantification of rights, the
implementation of a final decree will undoubtedly raise countless
challenges. The pressures of the burgeoning population of the region
will only heighten the complexity of efforts to draw the decades-old
adjudication to a close.
Additional questions will likely arise regarding the effectiveness of
the United States, as trustee, in its representation of Indian interests.
Commentators have lamented the lack of proper legal representation
and the United States' derogation of its duty to enforce Indian water
rights, particularly in light of the federal government's role as overseer
of the country's vast western reclamation projects."3 In his discussion
of the issue, Lloyd Burton cites "deep-seated institutional ambivalence
(some say 'conflict of interest')" intended to prevent enforcement of
the Winters doctrine in favor of Indian water rights." 4 Such
institutional ambivalence may explain why crucial questions regarding
tribal groundwater rights have received only passing discussion in the
nearly thirty-five years since Arizona v. California first defined the
potentially massive scope of Indian water rights.
A. ALTERNATIVES TO THE ADJUDICATION MODEL
In light of the delays, lingering uncertainties, and potential
systemic inequities, the promise of alternative methods of dispute
resolution becomes increasingly attractive. Two main alternatives,
113. See Jessica Bacal, The Shadow of Lone Wolf: Native Americans Confront Risks of
Quantificationof TheirReserved Water Rights, 12 U. BRIDGEPORTL. REv. 1, 27 (1991).
114. See Lloyd Burton, American Indian Water Rights in the Future of the Southwest, in
WATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHWEST 153, 158 (Zachary A. Smith ed., 1989).
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legislation and negotiation, each have their share of proponents.
Aside from relatively rare Supreme Court opinions, federal
legislation is the only vehicle for achieving consistent national policies
to define the scope of federal and Indian rights. In the legislative
arena, however, congressional action to date rarely has been consistent
except in one regard-Congress's repeated deference to state water
law.' While Congress clearly has authority to override state law and to
reserve quantities of both surface and groundwater for federal uses, it
only reluctantly prescribes broad national remedies
because
6
sensitivities over water rights in the West are extreme.1
Despite a history of congressional inactivity, proposals for
congressional action continue to surface. Burton suggests that two
types of legislation have arisen repeatedly:
1) bills submitted by western states' rights advocates to legislatively
terminate the Winters Doctrine and extinguish all Indian claims to
waters now in non-Indian use; 2) bills submitted by civil rightsoriented advocates for the federal adjudication of Winters Doctrine
claims, with-where necessary-termination of non-Indian rights and
reassignment of those rights to the tribes." 7

Each of these proposals has potential drawbacks. The first proposal
would override nearly a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence and
significantly undermine the economic and social viability of many
tribal lands. The second proposal would exact significant economic
and social upheaval on non-Indian populations with, undoubtedly,
considerable political repercussions. For these and other reasons, no
comprehensive legislation to effectively protect Indian water rights has
come to pass and none appears likely in the near future. "'
In recent decades, however, Congress has made progress using a
third alternative discussed by Burton-"case-by-case legislative
settlements of disputes between specific southwestern tribes and their
non-Indian neighbors."" 9 Recent congressional actions have ratified
more than a dozen privately negotiated settlements among Indian
communities and their non-Indian neighbors in at least seven western
states.'20 Tribal, state, and private parties to the negotiations have
successfully tackled a wide variety of issues, taking into account varying
social and economic interests and geologic settings when allocating
115. See Daniel McCool, Water and the Future of Non-Indian Federal Lands in the
Southwest, inWATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHWEST 113, 128 (Zachary A. Smith ed.,

1989).
116. Id. at 116. The McCarran Amendment, discussed supra note 45, is a rare
exception to Congress's reluctance to pass sweeping water rights legislation. In recent
years, Congress has used its reservation powers to expressly reserve water rights when
identifying specific federal reservations such as national monuments. For a discussion
of these actions, See SAX ET AL., supranote 7, at 812-14.
117.

See Burton, supranote 114, at 165-66.

118. Id. at 166.
119. Id.
120.

See Checchio & Colby, supra note 110, at 180-81.
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and quantifying water rights.' Parties to the negotiations can also use
congressionally ratified settlements, which carry the force of federal
law, to establish water management policies and water supply control
mechanisms.
Burton and others have suggested ways to enhance the success of
negotiated settlements, including the establishment of a federal-state-22
Indian commission to develop models and facilitate negotiations.
Allocation of federal funding, or private funding funneled through a
water use surcharge, could further enhance the potential for
negotiated settlements by helping to ameliorate the economic impacts
on non-Indian parties and speed the transfer of water rights from
Even with such incentives, highly political and
willing sellers."
technically complex negotiations in the context of groundwater rights
Among all available solutions, congressional
will be necessary.
ratification of locally negotiated settlements is the most promising
option on the water rights horizon.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the legal wrangling over the specific questions presented in
Gila River III may be over, the outcome of the larger general
adjudication effort is far from clear. In Arizona, the recent actions of
the state courts and the United States Supreme Court may alter the
historical balance of water rights, at least on paper. One still does not
know how further interpretation in the Arizona courts will translate
these paper rights into actual allotments of groundwater for federal
interests-particularly when any new groundwater withdrawals by
Indian or other federal interests must come at the expense of another
party. And, one still does not know how other western jurisdictions
will react to the precedent set in Arizona.
The decisions in Gila River III may affect, directly or indirectly, the
balance of water and power throughout the arid West. At the very
least, the Gila River III litigation has proven that courts take seriously
any potential federal claims to groundwater, a fact likely to prompt an
increasing number of non-Indian water2 4 users and rights-holders to
seek negotiated water rights settlements.'

121.
122.
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124.

Id. at 179-82.
See Burton, supra note 114, at 171-72.
Id. at 171-73
Checchio & Colby, supra note 110, at 188.

